INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION【2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载】

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Chapter 1 Introduction1

1.1.The Significance of the Subject1

1.2.Methodology and Structure6

1.3.Main Propositions8

Chapter 2 Preparatory Considerations9

2.1.Necessity and Permissibility of Functions Not Within the Original Contemplation of the Procedure9

2.2.Some Conceptual Clarifications12

2.2.1.Standard Setting12

2.2.2.Compliance Control15

2.2.3.Law Development18

2.2.4.International Arbitral， Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Procedures19

2.2.4.1.Arbitral， Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Nature20

2.2.4.2.International Character23

2.2.4.3.Scope of the Procedures Covered by this Book27

2.3.The Overall Analytical Framework： ‘Judicial Control’ Integrating Standard Setting and Law Development28

2.3.1.The Origin of the Concept of ‘Judicial Control’28

2.3.2.A Proposed Model of ‘Judicial Control’29

2.4.Angles of the Analysis32

2.4.1.Inter-State Relations versus State-Individual Relations32

2.4.2.‘Soft’ Control versus ‘Hard’ Control33

Chapter 3 Standard Setting35

3.1.Standard Setting in International Environmental Law35

3.2.Standard Setting for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources： Through the Practice of the ICJ， the ITLOS and Arbitral Tribunals38

3.2.1.Introduction38

3.2.2.The Practice of Arbitral Tribunals39

3.2.2.1.1893 Fur-Seals Case （UK/US）39

3.2.2.2.1910 Atlantic Fisheries Case （UK/US）41

3.2.2.3.1986 Filleting Case （Canada/France）43

3.2.3.The Practice of the ICJ44

3.2.3.1.1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases （UK v.Iceland； FRG v.Iceland）44

3.2.3.2.1998 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case （Spain v.Canada）47

3.2.4.The Practice of the ITLOS and an Arbitral Tribunal under the UNCLOS48

3.2.4.1.1999/2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases （Australia and New Zealand v.Japan）48

3.2.4.2.Currently Docketed Swordfish Case （Chile/EC）51

3.2.5.The International Judiciary’s Contribution to Setting Environmental Standards52

3.2.5.1.Standard Setting by the International Judicia Itself52

3.2.5.2.Assistance for Standard Setting by the Parities53

3.2.5.3.Clarification of the Requirements for Valid Domestic Standard Setting54

3.2.6.A Comparison between Compromis Application and Unilateral Application54

3.2.6.1.The Difference of the Influence54

3.2.6.2.Methods to Overcome the Difficulties in Setting Standards56

3.2.7.Concluding Remarks59

3.3.Towards Environmental Standard Setting as Conciliato Law-Making between the Parties： Lessons Learned from the ICJ Maritime Delimitation Cases60

3.3.1.Introduction： The Expected Conciliatory Role of the ICJ60

3.3.2.Methods in which the ICJ Engages in Conciliatory Law-Making in Maritime Delimitation63

3.3.2.1.Obedience to the Parties’ Common Views63

3.3.2.2.Adoption of Each Party’s Views64

3.3.2.3.Elaboration of the Court’s Own Views Equitably Adjusting the Parties’ Interests64

3.3.3.Concluding Remarks65

3.4.Setting Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards and More： The International Human Rights Judiciary’s Challenge to State Sovereignty67

3.4.1.Introduction67

3.4.2.The Individual-Oriented Judiciary’s Practice to Protect Human Rights against Environmental Destruction69

3.4.2.1.Human Rights Committee （HRC） of the ICCPR69

3.4.2.2.European Human Rights Commission and Court72

3.4.2.2.1.Noise73

3.4.2.2.2.Pollution77

3.4.2.2.3.Nuclear Risk79

3.4.2.2.4.Nature Conservation80

3.4.2.2.5.2001/2003 Hatton and Others v.UK82

3.4.3.Setting Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards： The Individual-Oriented Judiciary86

3.4.3.1.Coverage of Harm86

3.4.3.1.1.Health Effects86

3.4.3.1.2.Property Value’s Depreciation88

3.4.3.1.3.Amenity Deterioration89

3.4.3.1.4.Degradation of the Environment Per Se89

3.4.3.2.The ‘Victim’ Requirement90

3.4.3.3.State Discretion90

3.4.3.4.Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards91

3.4.3.4.1.Anthropocentricity of the Human Rights Concept91

3.4.3.4.2.Absence of an Environmental Provision91

3.4.3.4.3.Scientific Uncertainty and Non-Specificity of Environmental Harm91

3.4.3.4.4.State Sovereignty91

3.4.4.Setting Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards？ The Population-Oriented Judiciary92

3.4.4.1.The Population-Oriented Judiciary’s Practice to Protect Human Rights against Environmental Destruction92

3.4.4.1.1.Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court92

3.4.4.1.2.African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights93

3.4.4.1.3.Summing-Up95

3.4.4.2.Decrease of the Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards96

3.4.4.3.Potential Factors Enabling Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards96

3.4.4.3.1.The Communal Approach97

3.4.4.3.2.Active Reference to Outer-Regime Law97

3.4.5.Reference to Outer-Regime Law as a Way to Set Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards97

3.4.5.1.Reference to Outer-Regime Law Binding on the Accused State98

3.4.5.2.Reference to Outer-Regime Law Not Binding on the Accused State99

3.4.5.3.EU Environmental Law as Referable Outer-Regime Law101

3.4.6.The Recent Trend of the International Human Rights Judiciary’s Practice104

3.4.6.1.An Overview of Recent Cases104

3.4.6.1.1.The Individual-Oriented Judiciary’s Cases104

3.4.6.1.1.1.Human Rights Committee （HRC） of the ICCPR104

3.4.6.1.1.2.European Court of Human Rights105

3.4.6.1.2.The Population-Oriented Judiciary’s Cases： Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights109

3.4.6.2.An Assessment111

3.4.7.Concluding Remarks114

Chapter 4 Compliance Control117

4.1.Compliance Control in International Environmental Law117

4.2.The Montreal NCP’s ‘Soft’ Control： Evaluation through the Practice120

4.2.1.Introduction120

4.2.2.A Survey of the Procedure121

4.2.3.An Examination of the Practice of the Procedure123

4.2.3.1.Voluntary Submissions123

4.2.3.2.Secretariat Submissions127

4.2.4.Evaluation of the Nature of the Procedure129

4.2.4.1.Evidence for a ‘Soft’ Nature129

4.2.4.2.A Potential Tendency towards a ‘Hard’ Nature130

4.2.4.3.A Demand for a ‘Legal’ Nature131

4.2.5.A New Trend of the Recent Practice： Finding ‘Potential Non-Compliance’133

4.2.6.Concluding Remarks136

4.3.The ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control over Compliance with International Environmental Law： Its Procedural and Substantive Aspects137

4.3.1.Introduction137

4.3.2.Existence of the ECJ’s Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control141

4.3.2.1.A Survey of ECJ Procedures141

4.3.2.1.1.Opinion Procedure142

4.3.2.1.2.Contentious Procedures143

4.3.2.2.An Assessment143

4.3.3.Existence of the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control： With Special Emphasis on Nature Conservation and Hazardous Waste Management144

4.3.3.1.Preliminary Considerations144

4.3.3.1.1.The ECJ’s Basic Stance on Control over Compliance with International Law144

4.3.3.1.2.The ECJ’s Substantively ‘Soft’ Control： For the GATT/WTO Agreements145

4.3.3.2.Modalities of the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control147

4.3.3.2.1.Main Issues in Nature Conservation and Hazardous Waste Management148

4.3.3.2.2.Implicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law150

4.3.3.2.3.Explicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law153

4.3.3.2.3.1.Using International Environmental Law as a Benchmark of EC Law Violation153

4.3.3.2.3.2.Recognizing ‘Direct Applicability’ of Environmental Treaties155

4.3.3.2.3.3.Some Considerations156

4.3.3.3.Doubts about the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control160

4.3.4.Factors Enabling the ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control161

4.3.4.1.Factors Enabling Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control161

4.3.4.1.1.Presence of the Commission’s Pre-Litigation Procedure161

4.3.4.1.2.Existence of Active Applicants： the Commission and Private Parties162

4.3.4.1.3.Well-Arranged Mechanisms for Promoting Second-Order Compliance163

4.3.4.2.Factors Enabling Substantively ‘Hard’ Control166

4.3.4.2.1.Possible Justification by Environmental Treaties166

4.3.4.2.2.Irreparability and Transboundary Effect of the Harm167

4.3.4.2.3.Necessity for Establishing a Common Market168

4.3.5.Limits of the ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control168

4.3.5.1.Limits of Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control168

4.3.5.1.1.Infrequent Utilization of Inter-State Infringement Proceedings168

4.3.5.1.2.Respect for the Member States’ Discretion169

4.3.5.2.Limits of Substantively ‘Hard’ Control169

4.3.5.2.1.Respect for the EC Institutions’ Discretion169

4.3.5.2.2.A Demand for Free Trade170

4.3.6.Towards Substantively ‘Harder’ Control？ The ECJ’s Acknowledgment of Its Exclusive Jurisdiction on the Marine Environment170

4.3.6.1.Exclusive Jurisdiction as a Factor Leading to Substantively ‘Harder’ Control170

4.3.6.2.Cases Related to the ECJ’s Exclusive Jurisdiction172

4.3.6.2.1.ECJ Mox Plant Case： Clarification of Preconditions for Exclusive Jurisdiction172

4.3.6.2.2.Iron Rhine Arbitration： Resort to the Actes Clairs Doctrine and the CILFIT Test175

4.3.6.3.Marine Environment as a Major Playground for the ECJ’s Exclusive Jurisdiction178

4.3.6.4.Exclusive Jurisdiction as an Obstacle to Substantively ‘Harder’ Control181

4.3.6.5.Some Considerations182

4.3.7.Concluding Remarks183

4.4.From the GATT Judiciary’s ‘Soft’ Control to the WTO Judiciary’s ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection： Past， Present and Future185

4.4.1.Introduction185

4.4.2.The Nature of the GATT/WTO Judiciary’s Procedural Control187

4.4.2.1.The GATT/WTO Judiciary as a Manager of Quasi-Judicial Procedures187

4.4.2.2.The GATT Judiciary’s Relatively ‘Soft’ Control versus the WTO Judiciary’s Relatively ‘Hard’ Control in the Procedural Aspect189

4.4.2.2.1.Institutional Settings190

4.4.2.2.2.The Res Judicata Effect of a Ruling191

4.4.3.A Quest for the Nature of the GATT/WTO Judiciary’s Substantive Control194

4.4.3.1.The GATT Judiciary’s Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures194

4.4.3.1.1.1981 US - Tuna Case194

4.4.3.1.2.1987 US - Petroleum Tax Case195

4.4.3.1.3.1987 Canada - Herring and Salmon Case195

4.4.3.1.4.1990 Thailand - Cigarettes Case196

4.4.3.1.5.1991 US - Tuna/Dolphin Ⅰ Case196

4.4.3.1.6.1994 US - Tuna/Dolphin Ⅱ Case198

4.4.3.1.7.1994 US - Automobile Taxes Case199

4.4.3.2.The WTO Judiciary’s Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures200

4.4.3.2.1.1996 US - Gasoline Case200

4.4.3.2.2.1997 EC - Hormones Case203

4.4.3.2.3.1998 US - Shrimp Case206

4.4.3.2.4.1998 Australia - Salmon Case211

4.4.3.2.5.1998 Japan - Agricultural Products Ⅱ Case215

4.4.3.2.6.2001 EC - Asbestos Case217

4.4.3.2.7.2003 Japan - Apples Case220

4.4.3.3.The WTO Judiciary’s ‘Hard’ Control as Compared to the GATT Judiciary’s ‘Soft’ Control： In the Substantive Aspect from the Environmental Perspective221

4.4.3.3.1.Respect for Each Party’s Environmental Autonomy223

4.4.3.3.2.Consideration of Characteristics of Environmental Measures223

4.4.3.3.3.Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law224

4.4.4.Limit of the WTO Judiciary’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection and Its Possible Breakthrough227

4.4.4.1.Limit： Occurrence of Unavoidable Conflict between GATT/WTO Law and Non-GATT/ WTO Law227

4.4.4.2.Possible Breakthrough： Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law228

4.4.4.2.1.Arguments for and against the Application of Non-GATT/ WTO Law228

4.4.4.2.2.Proposals for the Prioritised Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law233

4.4.5.Obstacles to the WTO Judiciary’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection and Ways Forward234

4.4.5.1.2006 EC - Biotech Products Case： Non- Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Not Binding on All Contracting Parties234

4.4.5.1.1.Summary of the Case234

4.4.5.1.2.Meaning of ‘Applicable in the Relations between the Parties’ in Article 31（3）（c） of the Vienna Convention235

4.4.5.1.2.1.‘The Parties’235

4.4.5.1.2.2.‘Applicable in the Relations between’241

4.4.5.1.3.Conditions for the Reference to Other Treaties Which Are Binding on the Parties in Question but to Which Not All the Parties to the Treaty Being Interpreted Adhere243

4.4.5.1.4.Possibility of Referring to Treaties Not Binding on the Parties in Question and Non-Binding International Instruments247

4.4.5.2.2007 Brazil - Tyres Case： Insufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Binding on the Disputing Parties But Not Binding on All the WTO Contracting Parties248

4.4.5.2.1.Summary of the Case248

4.4.5.2.2.The Panel’s ‘Effects of the Measure’ Approach versus the AB’s ‘Objective of the Measure’ Approach250

4.4.5.2.3.The AB’s Insufficient Reference to a MERCOSUR-Related Agreement251

4.4.5.2.4.For Sufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law252

4.4.6.Concluding Remarks253

Chapter 5 Law Development255

5.1.Law Development in International Environmental Law255

5.2.The Obligation Not to Cause Transfrontier Pollution Harm as a Corollary of Territorial Sovereignty： Focusing on the Chernobyl Accident257

5.2.1.Introduction257

5.2.2.The Facts of the Chernobyl Accident259

5.2.3.State Responsibility for Transfrontier Pollution Harm by a Nuclear Accident260

5.2.3.1.Arguments in the International Law Association （ILA）260

5.2.3.2.Precedents before the Chernobyl Accident264

5.2.3.3.Decisions of Domestic Courts on the Chernobyl Accident267

5.2.3.4.Attitudes of States after the Chernobyl Accident269

5.2.3.5.Short Remarks272

5.2.4.Territorial Sovereignty as an Obstacle to Charge the State with State Responsibility273

5.2.4.1.Absence of Due Diligence273

5.2.4.2.Occurrence of Serious Harm280

5.2.4.3.Short Remarks282

5.2.5.Concluding Remarks284

5.3.The Principle of Equitable Utilization of International Watercourses： A Quest for Its Relationship with the Obligation Not to Cause Transfrontier Pollution Harm286

5.3.1.Introduction286

5.3.2.Preliminary Considerations289

5.3.2.1.The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle and the Equitable Utilization Principle289

5.3.2.1.1.The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle： Prevention of Factual Harm289

5.3.2.1.2.The Essence of the Equitable Utilization Principle： Balancing of Interests290

5.3.2.2.The Relationship between the Equitable Utilization Principle and the No Pollution Harm Principle Highlighted293

5.3.3.Arguments for the ‘Relaxation’ of the No Pollution Harm Principle by the Equitable Utilization Principle298

5.3.3.1.A Survey of Academic Views298

5.3.3.2.The Background of the Arguments： Protection of the Interests of Upper Riparian Developing Countries as Beginning Users301

5.3.4.Deliberations in the ILC and the Observations of Governments303

5.3.5.The 1997 Watercourses Convention309

5.3.5.1.Ex Ante Prevention of Harm （Article 7（1））： Rejection of ‘Relaxation’310

5.3.5.2.Ex Post Remedial Measures [Elimination or Mitigation of Harm and Discussion of Compensation] （Article 7（2））310

5.3.5.2.1.The Situation Where ‘Relaxation’ Can Be Argued： Reduction of Continuous Pollution （Ex Post Prevention of Harm）310

5.3.5.2.2.A Negative Attitude towards ‘Relaxation’311

5.3.5.3.Summing-Up312

5.3.6.An Examination of Some Judicial Precedents and State Practice312

5.3.7.The 1997 ICJ Gabcikovo Case317

5.3.8.An Overall Appraisal320

5.3.9.Concluding Remarks322

Chapter 6 Synthesis of the Analysis325

6.1.A Comprehensive Appraisal325

6.1.1.Standard Setting325

6.1.2.Compliance Control327

6.1.3.Law Development328

6.2.Reassessment of the Concept of ‘Judicial Control’329

6.2.1.Appropriateness of the Proposed Model of ‘Judicial Control’329

6.2.2.Scope of ‘Judicial Control’330

6.2.2.1 Scope Personae330

6.2.2.2.Scope Temporis331

6.2.3.Necessity， Effectiveness and Limits of ‘Judicial Control’332

6.2.4.Actual Effect of Standard Setting and Law Development on ‘Judicial Control’334

6.2.5.An Essential Feature of ‘Judicial Control’： Permeability to the Outer World336

6.2.6.Conflict between ‘Judicial Control’ and ‘Judicial Settlement of Disputes’339

6.3.Towards More Effective Functioning of International Environmental Law343

6.3.1.Reform Related to the Primary Rule System343

6.3.1.1.Setting Lower Standards for Less Capable Non-Compliant Parties343

6.3.1.2.Referring to （or Applying） Outer-Regime Law344

6.3.2.Reform Related to the Compliance Information System347

6.3.2.1.Collecting Information through on-the-Spot Investigation347

6.3.2.2.Collecting Information from Private Third Parties347

6.3.2.3.Disseminating Information to the Disputing Parties and Third Parties347

6.3.3.Reform Related to the Non-Compliance Response System348

6.3.3.1.Introducing Active Triggering Mechanisms in Inter-State Relations348

6.3.3.2.Promoting Ruling Implementation348

6.3.3.3.Selecting or Combining ‘Soft’/‘Hard’ Control Mechanisms349

6.4.Achievements， Limits and Possible Generalization350

6.5.Conclusion： The International Judiciary as an International Legal Guardian352

Bibliography355

Table of Cases381

Table of International Instruments399

Index403