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FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE【2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载】
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- ROSS P.BUCKLEY AND DOUGLAS W.ARNER 著
- 出版社: WOLTERS KLUWER
- ISBN:9041133542
- 出版时间:2011
- 标注页数:333页
- 文件大小:98MB
- 文件页数:356页
- 主题词:
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图书目录
Chapter 1 History of the Global Financial System1
1.1 History1
1.2 The Bretton Woods System8
1.2.1 Pressures on the Bretton Woods system10
1.2.2 Collapse of the Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System12
1.2.3 Financial Cooperation15
2.4 The IMF at the Onset of the Global Financial Crisis15
1.2.5 The World Bank at the Onset of the GFC17
1.2.6 The WTO at the Onset of the GFC18
1.3 The Globalised Financial System Today19
Chapter 2 The Latin American and African Debt Crisis of 198225
2.1 The Debt Crisis of 198225
2.2 The Loans of the 1970s: Their Origins & Destinations27
2.2.1 The Lenders27
2.2.2 The Borrowers28
2.3 Causes of the Latin American and African Debt Crisis29
2.3.1 Recycling of OPEC Funds29
2.3.2 Bank Behaviour30
2.3.2.1 Time and Ignorance of History32
2.3.2.2 Inexperience of the Banks32
2.3.2.3 Bank Profitability and Market Share33
2.3.2.4 The Promotion of Bankers’ Careers34
2.3.2.5 Strong Debtor Economies34
2.3.2.6 Syndicated Lending35
2.3.2.7 Floating Interest Rates35
2.3.2.8 The Position of US Banks at Home35
2.3.3 Debtor Nation Policies36
2.3.3.1 Large Budget Deficits36
2.3.3.2 Overvalued Exchange Rates36
2.3.3.3 Anti-export Trade Regimes36
2.3.3.4 Capital Flight37
2.3.3.5 Corruption37
2.3.4 External Factors38
2.3.4.1 Interest Rate Increases38
2.3.4.2 Adverse Exchange Rate Movements38
2.3.4.3 Falls in Commodity Prices39
2.3.4.4 The Worldwide Recession39
2.3.4.5 Cessation of Petro-Dollar Recycling39
2.3.4.6 Conclusion on External Factors39
Chapter 3 The Brady Plan of 1989 to 199441
3.1 Background to the Brady Plan41
3.2 The Baker Plan41
3.3 The Brady Plan42
3.3.1 Mexico’s Brady Restructuring43
3.3.1.1 Outcomes of Mexico’s Brady Restructuring46
3.3.2 Venezuela’s Brady Restructuring48
3.3.3 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring49
3.3.4 Argentina’s Brady Restructuring50
3.3.5 Collateralising Brady Bonds51
3.3.6 Conclusions Regarding the Brady Plan52
Chapter 4 The Asian Financial and Economic Crisis of 199755
4.1 The Crisis Erupts55
4.2 Causes of the Asian Crisis56
4.2.1 Type of Indebtedness57
4.2.2 Extent of Indebtedness57
4.2.2.1 Excess Liquidity in the Developed World58
4.2.2.2 The Central Role of Cross-Over Investors59
4.2.3 Financial Sector Weaknesses60
4.2.3.1 Failure to Intermediate Capital Flows Effectively60
4.2.3.2 The Premature Liberalisation of Local Financial Markets60
4.2.4 Fixed Exchange Rates61
4.2.5 Region-Wide Loss of Confidence62
4.3 Lessons from the Asian Crisis63
4.3.1 The Benefits of Floating Exchange Rates64
4.3.2 The High Risks of Foreign Currency Borrowing64
4.3.3 The Need for Long-Term Local Currency Capital64
4.3.4 International Capital Flows as a Product of Developed World Liquidity65
4.3.5 The Urgent Need for a New Perspective on Responsibility in International Lending and Investment65
4.4 The Role and Impact of the IMF in the Asian Crisis66
4.4.1 Misdiagnosis66
4.4.2 Excessive Conditionality68
4.4.3 Protection of the System and of Creditors68
4.4.4 Mishandling of Market Expectations69
4.4.5 Social Costs of IMF Policies70
4.5 Conclusions on the IMF’s Role in the Asian Crisis70
Chapter 5 The Post-Asian Crisis International Financial Architecture: 1998 to 200873
5.1 Financial Crises in the 1990s and the International Response73
5.2 Financial Stability75
5.3 Structure and Process76
5.3.1 International Financial Standards and Standard-Setting Organisations77
5.3.2 Standard-setting78
5.3.3 Implementation and Monitoring79
5.4 Financial Liberalisation and the WTO79
5.5 Development81
Chapter 6 The Argentine Implosion of 200183
6.1 The Argentine Experience83
6.2 Causes of the Argentine Crisis85
6.2.1 The Peso-Dollar Peg85
6.2.2 Excessive Indebtedness86
6.2.3 Corruption87
6.2.4 IMF Policies88
6.3 The Restructuring of Argentina’s Indebtedness89
Chapter 7 The Story of Debt Relief93
7.1 Debt Relief93
7.2 The US Approach to Iraqi Debt94
7.3 Debt-for-Development Exchanges99
Chapter 8 Causes of the GFC of 2008103
8.1 Background and Causes107
8.1.1 1929 to 1998: Foundations108
8.1.1.1 The US Financial Regulatory System108
8.1.1.2 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord110
8.1.1.3 Regulatory Origins of Securitisation111
8.1.1.4 Consequences for Debt Capital Markets112
8.1.1.5 The Asian Crisis of 1997 to 1998113
8.1.2 1998 to 2004: A New Model?114
8.1.2.1 The New Model: Universal Banking and Originate and Distribute114
8.1.2.2 Regulatory Reinforcement of the New Model115
8.1.3 2005 to 2006: Taking it to Excess and the Role of Basel Ⅱ117
8.1.3.1 Advanced Originate and Distribute117
8.1.3.2 Rating Agencies118
8.1.3.3 Basel Ⅱ119
8.2 Consequences and Responses122
8.2.1 Monoline Insurance Companies122
8.2.2 Bear Stearns123
8.2.3 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac124
8.2.4 Systemic Crisis125
Chapter 9 International Responses to the GFC127
9.1 Initial Domestic Responses127
9.2 A Global Financial Response Emerges130
9.3 FSF131
9.4 G20133
9.4.1 November 2008133
9.4.2 Working Groups136
9.4.3 April 2009: The Second G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting136
9.4.4 September 2009: The Third G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting140
9.4.5 June 2010: The Fourth G20 Heads of Government Meeting142
9.4.6 November 2010: The Fifth G20 Heads of Government Meeting143
9.5 Role of the IMF, MDBs and WTO in Crisis Response145
9.6 Conclusion146
Chapter 10 Post-crisis International Financial Regulation149
10.1 Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk150
10.2 The Post-Crisis International Financial Regulatory Agenda152
10.2.1 The First G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishing the Agenda for Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Reform153
10.2.2 The Second G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishment of the FSB158
10.2.3 The Third and Fourth Leaders’ Summits: Maintaining Commitment160
10.2.4 The Fifth G20 Leaders’ Summit: Endorsing the ‘New Financial Regulatory Framework’160
10.3 Financial Infrastructure and Financial Regulation162
10.3.1 Capital, Leverage and Liquidity162
10.3.2 OTC Derivatives Markets165
10.3.3 Accounting Standards167
10.3.4 Compensation Arrangements167
10.3.5 Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter: Regulation of Non-traditional Financial Firms168
10.3.5.1 Hedge Funds168
10.3.5.2 Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies169
10.3.5.3 Securitisation170
10.4 Macroprudential Regulation and Regulatory Design171
10.4.1 Macroprudential Supervision172
10.4.2 Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems173
10.5 Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Financial Institution Resolution176
10.5.1 Addressing SIFIs and G-SIFIs176
10.5.2 Liquidity Arrangements179
10.5.3 Deposit Insurance and Investor Protection Arrangements179
10.5.4 Financial Institution Resolution Arrangements180
10.6 Conclusion: Post-Crisis International Regulatory Responses183
Chapter 11 The Dodd-Frank Act: The US Legislative Response185
11.1 Introduction186
11.2 Supervisory Structure187
11.2.1 Financial Stability Oversight Council187
11.2.2 Orderly Liquidation Authority188
11.3 Financial Institutions189
11.3.1 Insurance Companies189
11.3.2 Depository Institutions189
11.3.3 Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds190
11.3.4 Credit Ratings Agencies191
11.4 Capital Markets and Products192
11.4.1 Securitisation192
11.4.2 Derivatives193
11.4.3 Payment, Clearing and Settlement Activities195
11.5 Corporate Governance195
11.6 Investor Protection196
11.7 Consumer Protection198
11.8 Commentary and Critique199
11.8.1 Reform Objectives200
11.8.2 Implementation201
Chapter 12 Regulatory Measures for Developing Nations205
12.1 Rigorous Local Prudential Regulation205
12.2 Debt Policy and Local Debt Capital Markets206
12.2.1 Borrow Less Foreign Currency206
12.2.2 Issue Less Short-Term Debt and More Long-Term Local Currency Debt207
12.3 Exchange Rate Policies208
12.4 Capital Controls211
12.4.1 Chile’s Controls214
12.4.2 Malaysia’s Controls215
12.4.3 The Uses of Inflow Controls216
12.4.4 The Uses of Outflow Controls217
12.4.5 Inflow and Outflow Controls Compared218
12.4.6 Inflow Controls in Developed Countries218
12.4.7 Conclusion on Capital Controls219
12.5 Be More Willing to Play the Default Card219
Chapter 13 Global Measures: National Balance Sheet Structures227
13.1 The National Balance Sheet Problem227
13.2 The Volatility Machine228
13.3 Original Sin229
13.4 Currency Mismatches230
13.5 Local Currency Bond Markets231
13.6 An International Solution233
13.6.1 Changing the Lending Policies of Multilateral Development Banks235
13.6.2 Local Currency Solutions236
13.6.3 Re-orienting the Paris Club236
13.7 Conclusion: National Balance Sheet Structures237
Chapter 14 Global Measures: Bank Levies and Financial Taxes239
14.1 Financial Market Trading: The Facts242
14.2 Proponents of a Financial Transaction Tax244
14.3 European Commission Review (April 2010)248
14.4 IMF Report: A Fair And Substantial Contribution By The Financial Sector (June 2010)250
14.5 Conclusion on Reports on the FTT251
14.6 Mechanics252
14.7 Conclusion253
Chapter 15 Global Measures: A Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime255
15.1 The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes Generally257
15.2 Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime?259
15.2.1 Traditional Absence of an Overarching Need for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime259
15.2.2 Difficulties of Creating International Institutions260
15.2.3 The Inability to Compel Participation in Such a Regime260
15.2.4 Perceived Interests of Creditors261
15.2.5 The Short-term Interests of Debtors262
15.3 A Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime262
15.4 A Chapter 9 Model for a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime263
15.5 Benefits of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime267
15.6 Collective Action Clauses268
15.7 The IMF Proposal: The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism270
15.8 Conclusion273
Chapter 16 Global Measures: IMF Reform275
16.1 The IMF and Poverty in Africa281
16.2 The Socialisation of Private Sector Debt283
16.3 The Fund’s Inability to Reinvent Itself286
Chapter 17 The Road Ahead293
17.1 Coordination295
17.2 Trade296
17.3 Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy296
17.3.1 Macroeconomic Policy297
17.3.2 Monetary Arrangements297
17.4 Financial Stability and Development298
17.4.1 Crisis Prevention: Regulation298
17.4.2 Crisis Management: Liquidity301
17.4.3 Crisis Resolution302
17.5 Sustainable Growth and Development303
17.6 Conclusion303
Bibliography309
Index329
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