图书介绍

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE【2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载】

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE
  • ROSS P.BUCKLEY AND DOUGLAS W.ARNER 著
  • 出版社: WOLTERS KLUWER
  • ISBN:9041133542
  • 出版时间:2011
  • 标注页数:333页
  • 文件大小:98MB
  • 文件页数:356页
  • 主题词:

PDF下载


点此进入-本书在线PDF格式电子书下载【推荐-云解压-方便快捷】直接下载PDF格式图书。移动端-PC端通用
种子下载[BT下载速度快]温馨提示:(请使用BT下载软件FDM进行下载)软件下载地址页直链下载[便捷但速度慢]  [在线试读本书]   [在线获取解压码]

下载说明

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILUREPDF格式电子书版下载

下载的文件为RAR压缩包。需要使用解压软件进行解压得到PDF格式图书。

建议使用BT下载工具Free Download Manager进行下载,简称FDM(免费,没有广告,支持多平台)。本站资源全部打包为BT种子。所以需要使用专业的BT下载软件进行下载。如BitComet qBittorrent uTorrent等BT下载工具。迅雷目前由于本站不是热门资源。不推荐使用!后期资源热门了。安装了迅雷也可以迅雷进行下载!

(文件页数 要大于 标注页数,上中下等多册电子书除外)

注意:本站所有压缩包均有解压码: 点击下载压缩包解压工具

图书目录

Chapter 1 History of the Global Financial System1

1.1 History1

1.2 The Bretton Woods System8

1.2.1 Pressures on the Bretton Woods system10

1.2.2 Collapse of the Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System12

1.2.3 Financial Cooperation15

2.4 The IMF at the Onset of the Global Financial Crisis15

1.2.5 The World Bank at the Onset of the GFC17

1.2.6 The WTO at the Onset of the GFC18

1.3 The Globalised Financial System Today19

Chapter 2 The Latin American and African Debt Crisis of 198225

2.1 The Debt Crisis of 198225

2.2 The Loans of the 1970s: Their Origins & Destinations27

2.2.1 The Lenders27

2.2.2 The Borrowers28

2.3 Causes of the Latin American and African Debt Crisis29

2.3.1 Recycling of OPEC Funds29

2.3.2 Bank Behaviour30

2.3.2.1 Time and Ignorance of History32

2.3.2.2 Inexperience of the Banks32

2.3.2.3 Bank Profitability and Market Share33

2.3.2.4 The Promotion of Bankers’ Careers34

2.3.2.5 Strong Debtor Economies34

2.3.2.6 Syndicated Lending35

2.3.2.7 Floating Interest Rates35

2.3.2.8 The Position of US Banks at Home35

2.3.3 Debtor Nation Policies36

2.3.3.1 Large Budget Deficits36

2.3.3.2 Overvalued Exchange Rates36

2.3.3.3 Anti-export Trade Regimes36

2.3.3.4 Capital Flight37

2.3.3.5 Corruption37

2.3.4 External Factors38

2.3.4.1 Interest Rate Increases38

2.3.4.2 Adverse Exchange Rate Movements38

2.3.4.3 Falls in Commodity Prices39

2.3.4.4 The Worldwide Recession39

2.3.4.5 Cessation of Petro-Dollar Recycling39

2.3.4.6 Conclusion on External Factors39

Chapter 3 The Brady Plan of 1989 to 199441

3.1 Background to the Brady Plan41

3.2 The Baker Plan41

3.3 The Brady Plan42

3.3.1 Mexico’s Brady Restructuring43

3.3.1.1 Outcomes of Mexico’s Brady Restructuring46

3.3.2 Venezuela’s Brady Restructuring48

3.3.3 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring49

3.3.4 Argentina’s Brady Restructuring50

3.3.5 Collateralising Brady Bonds51

3.3.6 Conclusions Regarding the Brady Plan52

Chapter 4 The Asian Financial and Economic Crisis of 199755

4.1 The Crisis Erupts55

4.2 Causes of the Asian Crisis56

4.2.1 Type of Indebtedness57

4.2.2 Extent of Indebtedness57

4.2.2.1 Excess Liquidity in the Developed World58

4.2.2.2 The Central Role of Cross-Over Investors59

4.2.3 Financial Sector Weaknesses60

4.2.3.1 Failure to Intermediate Capital Flows Effectively60

4.2.3.2 The Premature Liberalisation of Local Financial Markets60

4.2.4 Fixed Exchange Rates61

4.2.5 Region-Wide Loss of Confidence62

4.3 Lessons from the Asian Crisis63

4.3.1 The Benefits of Floating Exchange Rates64

4.3.2 The High Risks of Foreign Currency Borrowing64

4.3.3 The Need for Long-Term Local Currency Capital64

4.3.4 International Capital Flows as a Product of Developed World Liquidity65

4.3.5 The Urgent Need for a New Perspective on Responsibility in International Lending and Investment65

4.4 The Role and Impact of the IMF in the Asian Crisis66

4.4.1 Misdiagnosis66

4.4.2 Excessive Conditionality68

4.4.3 Protection of the System and of Creditors68

4.4.4 Mishandling of Market Expectations69

4.4.5 Social Costs of IMF Policies70

4.5 Conclusions on the IMF’s Role in the Asian Crisis70

Chapter 5 The Post-Asian Crisis International Financial Architecture: 1998 to 200873

5.1 Financial Crises in the 1990s and the International Response73

5.2 Financial Stability75

5.3 Structure and Process76

5.3.1 International Financial Standards and Standard-Setting Organisations77

5.3.2 Standard-setting78

5.3.3 Implementation and Monitoring79

5.4 Financial Liberalisation and the WTO79

5.5 Development81

Chapter 6 The Argentine Implosion of 200183

6.1 The Argentine Experience83

6.2 Causes of the Argentine Crisis85

6.2.1 The Peso-Dollar Peg85

6.2.2 Excessive Indebtedness86

6.2.3 Corruption87

6.2.4 IMF Policies88

6.3 The Restructuring of Argentina’s Indebtedness89

Chapter 7 The Story of Debt Relief93

7.1 Debt Relief93

7.2 The US Approach to Iraqi Debt94

7.3 Debt-for-Development Exchanges99

Chapter 8 Causes of the GFC of 2008103

8.1 Background and Causes107

8.1.1 1929 to 1998: Foundations108

8.1.1.1 The US Financial Regulatory System108

8.1.1.2 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord110

8.1.1.3 Regulatory Origins of Securitisation111

8.1.1.4 Consequences for Debt Capital Markets112

8.1.1.5 The Asian Crisis of 1997 to 1998113

8.1.2 1998 to 2004: A New Model?114

8.1.2.1 The New Model: Universal Banking and Originate and Distribute114

8.1.2.2 Regulatory Reinforcement of the New Model115

8.1.3 2005 to 2006: Taking it to Excess and the Role of Basel Ⅱ117

8.1.3.1 Advanced Originate and Distribute117

8.1.3.2 Rating Agencies118

8.1.3.3 Basel Ⅱ119

8.2 Consequences and Responses122

8.2.1 Monoline Insurance Companies122

8.2.2 Bear Stearns123

8.2.3 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac124

8.2.4 Systemic Crisis125

Chapter 9 International Responses to the GFC127

9.1 Initial Domestic Responses127

9.2 A Global Financial Response Emerges130

9.3 FSF131

9.4 G20133

9.4.1 November 2008133

9.4.2 Working Groups136

9.4.3 April 2009: The Second G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting136

9.4.4 September 2009: The Third G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting140

9.4.5 June 2010: The Fourth G20 Heads of Government Meeting142

9.4.6 November 2010: The Fifth G20 Heads of Government Meeting143

9.5 Role of the IMF, MDBs and WTO in Crisis Response145

9.6 Conclusion146

Chapter 10 Post-crisis International Financial Regulation149

10.1 Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk150

10.2 The Post-Crisis International Financial Regulatory Agenda152

10.2.1 The First G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishing the Agenda for Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Reform153

10.2.2 The Second G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishment of the FSB158

10.2.3 The Third and Fourth Leaders’ Summits: Maintaining Commitment160

10.2.4 The Fifth G20 Leaders’ Summit: Endorsing the ‘New Financial Regulatory Framework’160

10.3 Financial Infrastructure and Financial Regulation162

10.3.1 Capital, Leverage and Liquidity162

10.3.2 OTC Derivatives Markets165

10.3.3 Accounting Standards167

10.3.4 Compensation Arrangements167

10.3.5 Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter: Regulation of Non-traditional Financial Firms168

10.3.5.1 Hedge Funds168

10.3.5.2 Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies169

10.3.5.3 Securitisation170

10.4 Macroprudential Regulation and Regulatory Design171

10.4.1 Macroprudential Supervision172

10.4.2 Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems173

10.5 Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Financial Institution Resolution176

10.5.1 Addressing SIFIs and G-SIFIs176

10.5.2 Liquidity Arrangements179

10.5.3 Deposit Insurance and Investor Protection Arrangements179

10.5.4 Financial Institution Resolution Arrangements180

10.6 Conclusion: Post-Crisis International Regulatory Responses183

Chapter 11 The Dodd-Frank Act: The US Legislative Response185

11.1 Introduction186

11.2 Supervisory Structure187

11.2.1 Financial Stability Oversight Council187

11.2.2 Orderly Liquidation Authority188

11.3 Financial Institutions189

11.3.1 Insurance Companies189

11.3.2 Depository Institutions189

11.3.3 Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds190

11.3.4 Credit Ratings Agencies191

11.4 Capital Markets and Products192

11.4.1 Securitisation192

11.4.2 Derivatives193

11.4.3 Payment, Clearing and Settlement Activities195

11.5 Corporate Governance195

11.6 Investor Protection196

11.7 Consumer Protection198

11.8 Commentary and Critique199

11.8.1 Reform Objectives200

11.8.2 Implementation201

Chapter 12 Regulatory Measures for Developing Nations205

12.1 Rigorous Local Prudential Regulation205

12.2 Debt Policy and Local Debt Capital Markets206

12.2.1 Borrow Less Foreign Currency206

12.2.2 Issue Less Short-Term Debt and More Long-Term Local Currency Debt207

12.3 Exchange Rate Policies208

12.4 Capital Controls211

12.4.1 Chile’s Controls214

12.4.2 Malaysia’s Controls215

12.4.3 The Uses of Inflow Controls216

12.4.4 The Uses of Outflow Controls217

12.4.5 Inflow and Outflow Controls Compared218

12.4.6 Inflow Controls in Developed Countries218

12.4.7 Conclusion on Capital Controls219

12.5 Be More Willing to Play the Default Card219

Chapter 13 Global Measures: National Balance Sheet Structures227

13.1 The National Balance Sheet Problem227

13.2 The Volatility Machine228

13.3 Original Sin229

13.4 Currency Mismatches230

13.5 Local Currency Bond Markets231

13.6 An International Solution233

13.6.1 Changing the Lending Policies of Multilateral Development Banks235

13.6.2 Local Currency Solutions236

13.6.3 Re-orienting the Paris Club236

13.7 Conclusion: National Balance Sheet Structures237

Chapter 14 Global Measures: Bank Levies and Financial Taxes239

14.1 Financial Market Trading: The Facts242

14.2 Proponents of a Financial Transaction Tax244

14.3 European Commission Review (April 2010)248

14.4 IMF Report: A Fair And Substantial Contribution By The Financial Sector (June 2010)250

14.5 Conclusion on Reports on the FTT251

14.6 Mechanics252

14.7 Conclusion253

Chapter 15 Global Measures: A Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime255

15.1 The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes Generally257

15.2 Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime?259

15.2.1 Traditional Absence of an Overarching Need for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime259

15.2.2 Difficulties of Creating International Institutions260

15.2.3 The Inability to Compel Participation in Such a Regime260

15.2.4 Perceived Interests of Creditors261

15.2.5 The Short-term Interests of Debtors262

15.3 A Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime262

15.4 A Chapter 9 Model for a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime263

15.5 Benefits of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime267

15.6 Collective Action Clauses268

15.7 The IMF Proposal: The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism270

15.8 Conclusion273

Chapter 16 Global Measures: IMF Reform275

16.1 The IMF and Poverty in Africa281

16.2 The Socialisation of Private Sector Debt283

16.3 The Fund’s Inability to Reinvent Itself286

Chapter 17 The Road Ahead293

17.1 Coordination295

17.2 Trade296

17.3 Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy296

17.3.1 Macroeconomic Policy297

17.3.2 Monetary Arrangements297

17.4 Financial Stability and Development298

17.4.1 Crisis Prevention: Regulation298

17.4.2 Crisis Management: Liquidity301

17.4.3 Crisis Resolution302

17.5 Sustainable Growth and Development303

17.6 Conclusion303

Bibliography309

Index329

热门推荐