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Chapter 1 Introduction1

1.1 Introduction1

1.2 Setting the Scene1

1.3 Use of Terms6

1.3.1 Catastrophes6

1.3.2 Natural Catastrophes, Large-Scale Terrorism Events and Man-Made Disasters8

1.3.3 Victims and Their Damages9

1.3.4 Financial Compensation10

1.4 Methodology11

1.4.1 Law and Economics11

1.4.2 Behavioural Law and Economics13

1.4.3 Legal Analysis14

1.4.4 Comparative Law and Economics14

1.5 A Brief Overview15

Part Ⅰ A Law and Economics Perspective on Compensation for Catastrophe Victims19

Chapter 2 The Prevention of Catastrophes: Liability Law and Safety Regulation19

2.1 Introduction19

2.2 Liability law21

2.2.1 Main Characteristics of Liability Law21

2.2.1.1 Goals of Liability Law21

2.2.1.2 Characteristics of Tort Liability24

2.2.2 Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Tort Law26

2.2.3 Minimizing the Social Costs of Accidents28

2.2.4 The Learned Hand-Formula29

2.2.5 Negligence or Strict Liability for Unilateral Accidents?31

2.2.5.1 Introduction to the Shavell-Model31

2.2.5.2 The Negligence Rule32

2.2.5.3 The Strict Liability Rule33

2.2.5.4 Interim Findings Relevant for Man-Made Catastrophes34

2.2.5.5 A Few Refinements36

2.2.5.6 The Use of Liability Law for Man-Made Catastrophes38

2.2.6 Governmental Liability for Catastrophes39

2.3 Tort Law Is Not the Only Instrument Internalizing Externalities42

2.4 Safety Regulation42

2.4.1 Introduction43

2.4.2 Explanations for Government Regulation44

2.4.3 Safety Regulation to Prevent Catastrophes45

2.4.4 Loss-Reduction Measures and Safety Regulation47

2.5 Safety Regulation versus Liability Law48

2.5.1 The Law and Economics Approach on Safety Regulation versus Liability Law49

2.5.2 Safety Regulation versus Liability Law in the Case of Catastrophe Risks52

2.6 Conclusion on the Prevention of Catastrophes54

Chapter 3 On the Edge of Prevention and Compensation: Insurance57

3.1 Introduction57

3.2 Basic Principles of Insurance58

3.2.1 Expected Utility, Risk Aversion and Insurance58

3.2.2 The Law of Large Numbers59

3.2.3 Insurance Premium60

3.2.4 Insurers' Problems due to Asymmetric Information61

3.2.4.1 Moral Hazard61

3.2.4.2 Remedies to Control Moral Hazard62

3.2.4.3 Adverse Selection64

3.2.4.4 Remedies to Control Adverse Selection65

3.2.5 A Competitive Insurance Market66

3.2.6 Features of Insurability67

3.3 Liability Insurance69

3.3.1 Introduction to Liability Insurance70

3.3.2 Compensation for Personal Injury or Property Damage72

3.3.3 Trends in Liability Law and Their Effects on Liability Insurance73

3.3.3.1 Joint and Several Liability73

3.3.3.2 Channelling of Liability74

3.3.3.3 Shifting the Risk of Causal Uncertainty75

3.3.3.4 Retrospective Liability76

3.3.4 Compulsory Liability Insurance77

3.3.4.1 Economic Arguments for Compulsory Liability Insurance77

3.3.4.2 Potential Drawbacks of Compulsory Liability Insurance79

3.3.4.3 Conclusions on Compulsory Liability Insurance81

3.4 First-Party Insurance82

3.4.1 Introduction to First-Party Insurance82

3.4.2 Compensation for Personal Injury or Property Damage84

3.5 Insurance in the Context of Catastrophe Risks85

3.5.1 The Insurability of Catastrophes85

3.5.1.1 Natural Catastrophes85

3.5.1.2 Terrorism Events88

3.5.1.3 Man-Made Catastrophes90

3.5.1.4 Conclusion on the Insurability of Catastrophes91

3.5.2 Liability Insurance in the Context of Man-Made Catastrophes94

3.5.2.1 Introduction94

3.5.2.2 Limited Insurance Capacity?94

3.5.3 First-Party Insurance in the Context of Natural Catastrophes97

3.5.3.1 Introduction97

3.5.3.2 Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Disasters97

3.5.3.2.1 The Decision to Purchase First-Party Insurance: Expected Utility Hypothesis and Other Considerations97

3.5.3.2.2 The Lack of Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes99

3.5.3.2.3 Behavioural Law and Economics on the Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes102

3.5.3.2.3.1 It Will Not Happen to Me103

3.5.3.2.3.2 Ex Post Government Assistance107

3.5.3.2.3.3 Preference for Uncertain Losses108

3.5.3.2.3.4 Ineffective Information108

3.5.3.2.3.5 Severe Budget Constraints109

3.5.3.2.3.6 Conclusions109

3.5.3.3 Supply of First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes110

3.5.3.3.1 Correlation111

3.5.3.3.2 Uncertainty of the Risk111

3.5.3.3.3 Limited Capacity112

3.5.3.3.4 Risk as Feelings112

3.5.3.4 Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance113

3.5.3.4.1 Advantages114

3.5.3.4.2 Setting the Premium in an All-Hazards Insurance Policy115

3.5.3.5 Compulsory First-Party Disaster Coverage?117

3.5.3.5.1 Economic Arguments for Compulso First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes118

3.5.3.5.2 Drawbacks (and Refinements)120

3.5.3.6 Conclusion: Mandatory Comprehensive Disaster Insurance or the Public Purse?122

3.6 Conclusion on Insurance against Catastrophes124

Chapter 4 Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem127

4.1 Introduction127

4.2 Reinsurance129

4.2.1 The Concept of Reinsurance129

4.2.2 Goals of Reinsurance130

4.2.3 Forms of Reinsurance131

4.2.4 The Reinsurance Premium134

4.2.5 Reinsurance for Catastrophes134

4.2.5.1 Insurer Demand for (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance135

4.2.5.2 Supply of (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance136

4.2.5.3 Market Cycles138

4.2.5.4 Conclusion on Reinsurance for Catastrophes138

4.3 Alternative Risk Transfer139

4.3.1 Introduction to Alternative Risk Transfer141

4.3.1.1 Classifications of Alternative Risk Transfer141

4.3.1.2 ART Market Participants143

4.3.1.3 The Future of ART143

4.3.2 Self-Insurance and Captives144

4.3.3 Pools146

4.3.3.1 Pooling by Insurers147

4.3.3.2 Pooling by Operators148

4.3.4 Capital Market Instruments149

4.3.4.1 Introduction149

4.3.4.1.1 Securitization and Insurance-Linked Securities150

4.3.4.1.2 Contingent Capital151

4.3.4.1.3 (Insurance) Derivatives151

4.3.4.2 Insurance-Linked Securities152

4.3.4.2.1 Standard Structure152

4.3.4.2.2 Benefits and Costs of Insurance-Linked Securities152

4.3.4.2.3 Triggers153

4.3.4.2.4 Catastrophe Bonds154

4.3.4.2.4.1 Standard Structure155

4.3.4.2.4.2 Catastrophes Covered156

4.3.4.2.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Catastrophe Bonds156

4.3.4.2.4.4 Future Prospects for Catastrophe Bonds158

4.3.4.3 Contingent Capital159

4.3.4.3.1 Standard Structure159

4.3.4.3.2 Benefits and Costs of Contingent Capital161

4.3.4.4 Catastrophe Derivatives162

4.3.4.4.1 Standard Structure162

4.3.4.4.2 Benefits and Costs of (Catastrophe) Derivatives163

4.3.4.4.3 Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Derivatives165

4.3.4.4.3.1 Chicago Board of Trade165

4.3.4.4.3.2 Catastrophe Risk Exchange166

4.3.4.4.3.3 Bermuda Commodities Exchange166

4.3.4.4.4 OTC Catastrophe Derivatives167

4.3.4.4.4.1 Catastrophe Swap167

4.3.4.4.4.2 Pure Catastrophe Swap167

4.3.4.4.4.3 Weather Derivatives168

4.3.4.4.5 Challenges for Catastrophe Derivatives169

4.3.4.5 A Comparative Analysis of Capital Market Instruments169

4.3.4.5.1 Liquidity Risk, Basis Risk, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, and Credit Risk170

4.3.4.5.2 Catastrophe Bonds Versus Catastrophe Reinsurance174

4.3.4.6 Capital Markets and the Terrorism Risk177

4.3.4.6.1 The Potential of Capital Market Instruments to Undertake Terrorism Coverage177

4.3.4.6.2 A Market for Terrorism Catastrophe Bonds?178

4.3.4.7 Conclusions on Capital Markets as an Instrument to Manage the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem179

4.4 Conclusions on Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem181

Chapter 5 The Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages185

5.1 Introduction185

5.2 The Potential Role of the Government within the Insurance Market187

5.2.1 Types of Government Intervention187

5.2.1.1 Supporting the Private Insurance Market188

5.2.1.2 Risk-Sharing with the Private Sector: The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort189

5.2.1.3 Government-Provided Insurance190

5.2.1.4 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: The Auctioning of XOL Contracts190

5.2.2 A Law and Economics Perspective on Government Intervention in the Catastrophe Insurance Market192

5.2.2.1 An Overview of Theories of Public Policy193

5.2.2.2 Law and Economics Perspective195

5.2.2.2.1 Arguments in Favour of Government Intervention195

5.2.2.2.2 Arguments against Government Intervention197

5.2.3 Modalities for Efficient Government Intervention in the Catastrophe Insurance Markets199

5.2.4 Conclusions on the Government Intervening within the Private Catastrophe Insurance Market202

5.3 The Potential Role of the Government Outside the Insurance Market202

5.3.1 Types of Government Intervention203

5.3.1.1 Additional Risk Layer for the Government203

5.3.1.2 Government-Run Compensation Funds204

5.3.1.3 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: Government as Lender of Last Resort205

5.3.2 A Law and Economics Perspective on Government Intervention Outside the Catastrophe Insurance Market206

5.4 Conclusion on the Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages208

Chapter 6 Summary Findings and Policy Recommendations211

6.1 Introduction211

6.2 Point of Departure212

6.3 Overarching Principles212

6.4 Classification of Catastrophes214

6.5 Natural Catastrophes215

6.5.1 Liability Law215

6.5.2 First-Party Insurance215

6.5.3 Further Government Intervention217

6.5.4 Other Financing Techniques to be Pushed Forward218

6.5.5 Conclusion219

6.6 Technological Catastrophes220

6.6.1 Liability Law220

6.6.2 Liability Insurance222

6.6.3 Further Government Intervention222

6.6.4 Other Financing Techniques to be Pushed Forward223

6.6.5 First-Party Insurance223

6.6.6 Conclusion224

6.7 Terrorism Events225

6.7.1 Liability Law (and Liability Insurance)225

6.7.2 First-Party Insurance227

6.7.3 An Important Governmental Role227

6.7.4 Conclusion229

Part Ⅱ Compensation Solutions in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United States235

Chapter 7 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in Belgium235

7.1 Introduction235

7.2 Social Security236

7.2.1 Workers' Compensation237

7.2.2 Health Insurance238

7.3 Liability Law240

7.3.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence240

7.3.2 The Two Basic Requirements of Strict Liability241

7.3.3 Compensation under Tort Law243

7.3.4 Governmental Liability244

7.4 Insurance (and Government Intervention)246

7.4.1 Natural Disasters247

7.4.1.1 A Retrospective248

7.4.1.1.1 Act of 12 July 1976248

7.4.1.1.1.1 Main Disposals248

7.4.1.1.1.2 Disadvantages249

7.4.1.1.1.3 The 1976 Act in Practice250

7.4.1.1.2 Royal Decree of 24 December 1992251

7.4.1.1.3 Royal Decree of 16 January 1995252

7.4.1.1.4 Act of 21 May 2003253

7.4.1.2 Act of 17 September 2005254

7.4.1.2.1 Area of Application254

7.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage255

7.4.1.2.3 Insurance Premium256

7.4.1.2.4 Guarantees for the Insurer257

7.4.1.2.5 Tariffication Office258

7.4.1.2.6 Advantages258

7.4.1.2.7 Conclusion258

7.4.1.2.8 Judgment Number 39/2007 of the Constitutional Court of 15 March 2007259

7.4.2 Terrorist Attacks260

7.4.2.1 A Retrospective260

7.4.2.1.1 Insurance Act260

7.4.2.1.2 Royal Decree of 1 February 1988 and of 24 December 1992261

7.4.2.2 Act of 1 April 2007263

7.4.2.2.1 Area of Application263

7.4.2.2.2 Maximum Compensation264

7.4.2.2.3 Covered Damages265

7.4.3 Man-Made Disasters266

7.4.3.1 Act of 30 July 1979267

7.4.3.1.1 Prevention267

7.4.3.1.2 Compensation268

7.4.3.1.3 Disadvantages268

7.4.3.2 Gellingen/Ghislenghien: A Combination of Insurance and Solidarity269

7.5 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in Belgium272

7.5.1 Natural Catastrophes273

7.5.2 Man-Made Disasters276

7.5.3 Terrorist Attacks278

Chapter 8 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in France283

8.1 Introduction283

8.2 Social Security284

8.2.1 Workers' Compensation285

8.2.2 Health Insurance287

8.3 Liability Law289

8.3.1 Private Liability Law289

8.3.1.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence289

8.3.1.2 The Three Basic Requirements of Strict Liability291

8.3.2 Public Liability Law292

8.3.2.1 Fault Liability of Public Authorities293

8.3.2.2 Strict Liability of Public Authorities294

8.3.2.3 Governmental Liability for Catastrophes294

8.3.2.3.1 Natural Catastrophes294

8.3.2.3.1.1 Liability of the Mayor in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes294

8.3.2.3.1.2 Liability of the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes296

8.3.2.3.1.3 An Example of Liability of the Mayor and the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes297

8.3.2.3.2 Terrorist Attacks298

8.3.3 Compensation under Liability Law299

8.4 Insurance (and Government Intervention)300

8.4.1 ‘Garantie des Accidents de la Vie' and Other Insurance Contracts Covering Personal Injuries301

8.4.1.1 ‘Garantie des Accidents de la Vie'301

8.4.1.2 Other Insurance Contracts Covering Personal Injuries302

8.4.2 Natural Disasters302

8.4.2.1 Act of 13 July 1982303

8.4.2.1.1 Area of Application303

8.4.2.1.2 Natural Disasters304

8.4.2.1.3 Covered Damage305

8.4.2.1.4 Insurance Premium306

8.4.2.1.5 Compensation Procedure308

8.4.2.1.6 Guarantees for the Insurer309

8.4.2.1.7 Tariffication Office312

8.4.2.1.8 The Reform Project313

8.4.2.2 Act of 25 June 1990314

8.4.3 Terrorist Attacks316

8.4.3.1 Prevention and a Retrospective on Compensation316

8.4.3.2 Act of 9 September 1986317

8.4.3.2.1 Area of Application318

8.4.3.2.2 Acts of Terrorism318

8.4.3.2.3 A Special Provision in Case of ‘Major Risks'319

8.4.3.3 The New Terrorist Compensation Act320

8.4.3.4 Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Reassurance des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme321

8.4.3.4.1 The Creation of GAREAT321

8.4.3.4.2 Membership322

8.4.3.4.3 Structure322

8.4.3.4.4 Premium324

8.4.4 Man-Made Disasters326

8.4.4.1 A Retrospective326

8.4.4.2 Act of 30 July 2003328

8.4.4.2.1 Area of Application328

8.4.4.2.2 Technological Catastrophes329

8.4.4.2.3 Covered Damage331

8.4.4.2.4 Insurance Premium331

8.4.4.2.5 Compensation Procedure332

8.4.4.2.6 Subrogation332

8.5 Compensation Funds332

8.5.1 ‘Fonds de Garantie des Victimes d'Actes de Terrorisme et d'Autres Infractions'332

8.5.2 ‘Fonds de Garantie contre les Accidents'335

8.6 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in France337

8.6.1 Personal Injuries337

8.6.1.1 Natural Catastrophes, Terrorist Attacks and Man-Made Disasters337

8.6.1.2 Terrorist Attacks339

8.6.2 Property Damage339

8.6.2.1 Natural Catastrophes339

8.6.2.2 Man-Made Disasters342

8.6.2.3 Terrorist Attacks345

Chapter 9 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the Netherlands349

9.1 Introduction349

9.2 Social Security350

9.2.1 Workers' Compensation351

9.2.2 Health Insurance353

9.3 Liability Law354

9.3.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence355

9.3.2 The Two Basic Requirements of Strict Liability357

9.3.3 Compensation under Liability Law358

9.3.4 Governmental Liability359

9.4 Insurance and Government Intervention362

9.4.1 Natural (and Man-Made) Catastrophes363

9.4.1.1 A Retrospective of Insurance against Losses from Natural Disasters363

9.4.1.2 Act of 25 May 1998365

9.4.1.2.1 Area of Application367

9.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage369

9.4.1.2.3 Compensation Procedure370

9.4.1.2.4 The Calamities Compensation Act in Practice370

9.4.1.3 The Actual Insurability of Natural Catastrophes372

9.4.2 Terrorist Attacks375

9.4.2.1 A Retrospective375

9.4.2.2 The Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company NHT376

9.4.2.2.1 Area of Application377

9.4.2.2.2 Definition of the Terrorism Risk377

9.4.2.2.3 Capacity of the NHT378

9.4.2.2.4 Compensation Procedure379

9.4.2.2.5 Emergency Act on Financial Transactions380

9.4.2.2.6 The NHT in Practice381

9.5 Ad Hoc Compensation.The Example of Some Recent Man-Made Disasters381

9.5.1 Enschede382

9.5.1.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Enschede Catastrophe382

9.5.1.2 Governmental Liability?383

9.5.2 Volendam385

9.5.2.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Volendam Catastrophe385

9.5.2.2 Governmental Liability?386

9.6 Compensation Funds386

9.6.1 Ad Hoc Compensation Funds387

9.6.2 Structural Compensation Funds387

9.6.2.1 Introduction387

9.6.2.2 Compensation Fund for Victims of Violent Crime388

9.6.3 The National Disaster Fund389

9.7 Reform390

9.8 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in the Netherlands393

9.8.1 Natural Catastrophes394

9.8.2 Man-Made Disasters396

9.8.3 Terrorist Attacks398

Chapter 10 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the United States401

10.1 Introduction401

10.2 Social Security403

10.2.1 Workers' Compensation404

10.2.2 Disability Provisions405

10.2.3 Health Insurance407

10.2.4 Gaps in Social Security Coverage408

10.3 Liability Law409

10.3.1 Intentional Torts409

10.3.2 Negligence410

10.3.3 Strict Liability410

10.3.4 Compensation under Liability Law410

10.3.5 The Incentive to Sue in Tort, also after a Catastrophic Accident412

10.4 Private Insurance413

10.5 Government Assistance414

10.5.1 Legislative No-Fault or Insurance Schemes415

10.5.1.1 Federal Government Involvement in the Insurance Market415

10.5.1.1.1 National Flood Insurance Program415

10.5.1.1.1.1 A Retrospective of Assistance to Flood Victims415

10.5.1.1.1.2 The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968416

10.5.1.1.1.3 Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973418

10.5.1.1.1.4 National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994419

10.5.1.1.1.5 Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004419

10.5.1.1.1.6 The Provision of Flood Insurance: The WYO Program420

10.5.1.1.1.7 The Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement421

10.5.1.1.1.8 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy422

10.5.1.1.1.9 Covered Damage423

10.5.1.1.1.10 Insurance Premium424

10.5.1.1.1.11 Funding426

10.5.1.1.1.12 Flood Insurance Demand427

10.5.1.1.1.13 Problems with and Failures of the NFIP428

10.5.1.1.1.14 The Future of the NFIP432

10.5.1.1.2 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act438

10.5.1.1.2.1 Insured Losses after 9/11438

10.5.1.1.2.2 Background to Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002439

10.5.1.1.2.3 TRIA of 2002440

10.5.1.1.2.4 TRIEA of 2005446

10.5.1.1.2.5 Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007447

10.5.1.1.2.6 How Are the Losses Really Distributed under TRIA?448

10.5.1.1.2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of TRIA450

10.5.1.1.2.8 Expiration Debate and Alternatives to TRIA454

10.5.1.2 State Government Involvement in the Insurance Market459

10.5.1.2.1 California Earthquake Authority460

10.5.1.2.2 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund460

10.5.1.2.3 Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund461

10.5.2 Federal Emergency Relief: FEMA461

10.5.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities in Emergency Relief461

10.5.2.2 Federal Emergency Relief462

10.5.2.3 Disaster Relief to Individuals under FEMA464

10.5.2.4 FEMA in the Twenty-First Century464

10.5.3 Fund Solutions: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund465

10.5.3.1 The Special Master466

10.5.3.2 Eligibility to the Fund467

10.5.3.3 Covered Damage468

10.5.3.4 Compensation Procedure469

10.5.3.5 A Mixed Balance?470

10.5.3.6 The Fund as a Model for the Future?473

10.5.3.7 Financial Relief through the Fund475

10.5.3.8 Other Financial Relief after 9/11, Independent of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund476

10.5.3.8.1 Federal Aid476

10.5.3.8.2 Charity477

10.5.3.8.3 Tort477

10.5.3.8.4 Social Security479

10.5.3.8.5 Crime-Victim Programmes479

10.5.3.8.6 Workers' Compensation479

10.5.3.8.7 Tax Relief480

10.5.3.8.8 Totality of Compensation after 9/11481

10.6 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in the United States482

10.6.1 Natural Catastrophes483

10.6.2 Man-Made Disasters487

10.6.3 Terrorist Attacks489

Part Ⅲ Comparative Conclusions and Policy Recommendations with Regard to Compensating Catastrophe Victims495

Chapter 11 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective495

11.1 Introduction495

11.2 Natural Catastrophes496

11.2.1 Belgium496

11.2.2 France496

11.2.3 The Netherlands497

11.2.4 United States497

11.2.5 Comparative Table499

11.2.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective508

11.2.7 Summary515

11.3 Man-Made Disasters517

11.3.1 Belgium517

11.3.2 France518

11.3.3 The Netherlands518

11.3.4 United States518

11.3.5 Comparative Table519

11.3.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective524

11.3.7 Summary527

11.4 Terrorist Attacks529

11.4.1 Belgium529

11.4.2 France529

11.4.3 The Netherlands530

11.4.4 United States530

11.4.5 Comparative Table531

11.4.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective537

11.4.7 Summary542

Chapter 12 General Conclusions on Financial Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes545

12.1 Introduction545

12.2 Five Categories of Compensation Mechanisms546

12.3 Country Experiences546

12.4 An Interim Conclusion547

12.5 Policy Recommendations548

12.6 Final Conclusion550

12.7 Topics for Further Research552

Bibliography555

Index603